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Liberals, Socialists, and pork-barrel politics in Greece  
by  
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose*, Yannis Psycharis** and  
Vassilis Tselios*** 
  
Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of pork-barrel politics in the allocation of public investment 
expenditures in Greece. It proposes a model which explicitly relates the allocation of public 
investment to electoral results using a unique dataset covering the period from the restoration 
of democracy in 1974 until 2009, just before the Great Recession that radically transformed 
the political panorama of the country. The analysis includes ten legislative periods marked by 
governments of the two parties that dominated the political arena in Greece: the Liberal and 
the Socialist Party. The results show that Socialist and re-elected governments applied more 
expansionary fiscal policies relative to Liberals. The two main parties also used different 
tactics when it came to pork-barrelling: while the Socialists when in government 
rewarded/groomed their electoral fiefs, the Liberals invested in areas controlled by the 
opposition to win over new votes or seats. 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of the territorial allocation of public expenditure is an area of research with a 
long tradition. At the crossroads between public economics, political science, and political 
geography, the literature on the implications of pork-barrel politics has increasingly become 
more theoretically and empirically sophisticated (Golden and Min 2013). Different empirical 
studies offer a variety of outcomes and interpretations, depending on the discipline of origin, 
the approach adopted, or the individual countries or groups of countries covered.  
One of the drivers of this type of research is the realisation that government decisions about 
the geographical allocation of public spending are not always driven only by ‘objective’ 
socio-economic criteria, such as efficiency and/or equity, as the normative theory of public 
finance would claim (Buchanan 1950), but also by political considerations (Oates 1972; 
Bennett 1980). And in few countries has the link between pork-barrel politics and economic 
outcomes been more under the spotlight than in Greece, making it a particularly interesting – 
and, until now, neglected – case study to analyse for a number of reasons. 
First, pork-barrelling in public investment is always prominent in countries with strong 
clientelistic and/or nepotistic networks. In Greece the provision of collective goods, such as 
bridges and highways or schools and hospitals, has often been regarded as a perk to pay back 
voters for their electoral support. Second, Greece being a highly centralised country, the 
decisions about how to allocate public projects – regardless of whether the actual expenditure 
takes place at the national or at the local level – can often be traced back to national elections. 
Third, the high level of Greek fiscal centralisation and the lack of a specific formula for the 
regional allocation of public investment leaves plenty of room for political bargaining – and, 
hence, for pork-barrelling – about the territorial allocation of public expenditure. Fourth, 
regional development was one of the avowed policy priorities of successive Greek national 
governments throughout the period of analysis. Infrastructure investment was used as the 
main mechanism for upgrading the competitiveness and cohesion of regional economies and 
was the target of a high proportion of the projects co-funded through EU structural assistance. 
Fifth, Greece organized the 2004 Olympic Games. The preparation of the Games meant that 
considerable financial resources were channelled towards infrastructure investment of 
dubious sustainability. In addition, the need to meet strict deadlines in the preparation for the 
Games and the implementation of parallel programmes to the Olympic Games, such as the 
so-called Greece 2004 – financing athletic and other types of infrastructures in every single 
municipality across the country –is considered to have allowed plenty of opportunities for 
pork-barrel politics.  
The specific institutional conditions of Greece and the combination of factors outlined above 
hint that pork-barrel politics may have contributed to distorting regional development policy 
priorities and undermining the programmatic targeting towards the less well-off regions of 
the country. In addition, it might have contributed to a macroeconomic situation characterised 
by high public spending, growing deficits, and galloping debt.  
This paper examines the extent to which political factors (votes, seats in parliament, and the 
party in office) have shaped expenditure on local public goods across the 51 Greek NUTS III 
regions (nomoi) between the return to democracy in 1974 and the outbreak of the crisis in 
2009. The analysis considers the total volume of public investment expenditures by political 
period. Public investment expenditures constitute part of national budget and include national 
funds along with the structural assistance from the EU to finance public infrastructures in the 
country. Data have been disaggregated at NUTS III regional level, where administrative 
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divisions coincide with – with the exceptions of Athens and Thessaloniki – political 
constituencies. 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 discusses scholarly 
approaches to pork-barrelling and highlights the key features of the Greek political setting. 
Section 3 presents the data, the variables, and the econometric model. Section 4 discusses the 
regression results, while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Pork-barrel politics and public investment 
 
2.1 Politics and public investment  
Theories of distributive politics frequently pay particular attention to the processes behind 
pork-barrel politics. Electoral considerations often play a key role in the allocation of public 
expenditure by incumbent governments. Rather than expenditure following ‘objective’ socio-
economic criteria, in contexts where pork-barrelling is pervasive, electoral considerations and 
the expectations for and results of electoral contests may become fundamental drivers behind 
the territorial allocation of public expenditure. Incumbent governments, considered as profit 
maximisers, may allocate public resources with the aim of extracting the highest electoral 
benefit, rather than pursuing equity and/or efficiency. 
Scholarly research provides ample evidence of the presence of pork-barrel politics. There are 
numerous examples in Europe. Limosani and Navarra (2001) find that in pre-election yeas 
local policy-makers in Italy have had a tendency to increase investment outlays beyond their 
standard growth rate. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) demonstrate that in Sweden incumbent 
governments have used grant programmes to win votes. Celbis, de Crombrugghe and 
Muysken (2014) suggest that political bias has been present in the allocation decisions of 
regional transportation and communication public investments in Turkey. 
Pork-barrelling is also widespread as a political practice in the Americas. In the United States 
Primo and Snyder (2010), for example, show that those areas of the US where a party clearly 
dominates, attract less attention in terms of distributive spending, because of a decreased 
incentive for individual legislators to secure a ‘personal vote’ via local projects. More 
examples of pork-barrelling have been described by Chen (2010) in the case of New York, 
who proves that the electoral geography of legislative districts affects pork-barrelling under 
bicameralism. He indicates that greater electoral fragmentation has a negative effect on pork-
barrelling. Stokes (2005) depicts how in Argentina political machines (or clientelistic parties) 
mobilise electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their 
votes. Similarly, Costa-i-Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia, and Lunapla (2003) find a positive 
relationship between the regional allocation of public investment and past support for the 
central ruling party in Mexico. 
Not all research, however, indicates that pork-barrelling is pervasive. De La Calle and Orriols 
(2010) for example, using as a case study the expansion of the underground network in 
Madrid, show that, although governments are often tempted to follow vote-seeking strategies, 
they cannot deviate too much from an efficiency-based allocation of public resources. Luca 
and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) establish that, although politics in Turkey plays a non-negligible 
role in influencing public investment allocations, the magnitude of pork-barrelling is 
relatively low in comparison to the role played by socioeconomic factors when determining 
how to allocate public investment across Turkish regions. 
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In pork-barrel environments, the specific allocation of public funding frequently depends on 
the electoral prospects of the ruling party in specific constituencies. Political constituencies 
can be divided accordingly into three types (Johnston 1977): a) ‘hopeless’ areas, where the 
ruling party has a very low level of electoral support and little hope of ever winning more 
support; b) ‘safe’ areas, where the ruling party has a high level of popular support and its 
victory in various electoral contests is virtually guaranteed; and c) ‘marginal’ areas, where the 
ruling party either has a slight majority or its opponents have a slight lead over it. In such a 
categorization, governments will prioritise, depending on their main objectives, either 
rewarding existing electoral support or gaining new support.  
Two contesting models have been put forward in the scientific literature: the ‘loyal voter’ and 
the ‘swing voter’ model. The ‘loyal voter’ model assumes that governments allocate public 
funds to reward constituencies where their core supporters live (Cox and McCubbins 1986; 
Golden and Picci 2008). The ‘swing voter’ model assumes, by contrast, that governments 
prefer to splash public investment in those regions where the biggest electoral gains can be 
achieved (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Weghorst and Lindberg 
2013; Golden and Picci 2008). Whereas in the former model incumbent governments reward 
the past electoral support of their voters, in the latter they aim to buy-off votes by prioritizing 
expenditures to swing regions. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006: 549), in an attempt to bridge 
this dichotomy, argue that it may also be possible that parties chose to target both loyal and 
swing areas simultaneously. 
 
2.2 Greece, public investment, and pork-barrel politics 
There is a widespread popular perception that politics plays an important role in the regional 
distribution of public spending, in general, and public investment, in particular, in Greece. It 
is not infrequent to read in the local press news about politicians boasting about their capacity 
to influence and ‘deliver’ investments in, say, roads or schools for their constituencies. 
Political arguments make the public investment budget – an important section of the national 
budget – one of the most politicised instruments of government policy in the country 
(Psycharis 1990). While more ‘objective’ socio-economic criteria determine the bulk of 
public expenditure, this part of the national budget – which was introduced in 1952, has been 
the mechanism channelling EU structural funds to Greece since 1982, and is today under the 
authority of the Ministry of Development – remains however extremely vulnerable to 
political wrangling and pork-barrelling. Ministers, mayors, members of Parliament, and other 
politicians vie to carve a share of the public investment budget for their constituencies 
(Psycharis 2008). 
However, the popular view of a polity riddled by pork-barrelling has not really been 
confirmed by the scholarly literature. The number of studies on distributive politics in Greece 
remains limited. The few that exist generally validate the presence of pork-barrel politics in 
the regional allocation of public funds, but the results are extremely sensitive to the different 
approaches adopted. Lambrinidis, Psycharis and Rovolis (2005), for example, show that the 
percentage of votes in a prefecture in favour of the governing party has not been a 
fundamental driving force in the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure 
across prefectures. Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios (2012), by contrast, demonstrate 
that differences in votes between the governing and the main opposition party in each 
prefecture determine the territorial allocation of public investment, which, in turn, influences 
growth rates across Greek prefectures. Psycharis (2008) finds evidence that politicians in key 
positions in government have funnelled public spending to their constituencies and/or regions 
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of origin. As a result, the ways through which distributive politics influence the allocation of 
public investment are still open to investigation.  
This paper aims to supersede previous studies by proposing a model using the total volume of 
public investment – rather than public investment per capita (as in Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, 
and Tselios 2015) – by political period as dependent variable, in order to examine how 
politics affects the regional allocation of public investments. The analysis controls for a series 
of variables that, under normal circumstances, would have affected the territorial distribution 
of public investment. We specifically focus on how public investment is allocated in order to 
provide different types of public goods and collective services to people in different areas of 
the country. 
 
3. Data, Variables and Empirical specification: the Greek context 
The main aim of the paper is to assess the impact of political factors on the distribution of 
total public investment expenditures across 51 Greek regions (NUTS III level) over 10 
political periods, paying particular attention to the behaviour of different political parties with 
regards to pork-barrelling when in office. The choice of spatial level and political periods of 
analysis is not casual. 
The spatial level of analysis is NUTS III regions. NUTS III regions largely coincide with the 
Greek political constituencies. In a Greek Parliament of 300 seats, 288 members of 
Parliament (MPs) are elected directly in open lists on the basis of constituency votes. The 
remaining 12 MPs (i.e. the so called national deputies or ‘Epikrateias’) are elected from 
closed lists proposed by political parties. The allocation of these MPs to different political 
parties is proportional to the political power of each party after the elections (Rodríguez-Pose, 
Psycharis, and Tselios 2015). The 288 directly-elected MPs were elected in 56 constituencies: 
49 of these constituencies coincide with NUTS III regions. The only exceptions concern the 
regions of Attiki and Thessaloniki. Attiki is divided into five electoral constituencies (Athens 
A, Athens B, Piraeus A, Piraeus B, and Rest of Attiki). Thessaloniki, in turn, is divided into 
two electoral regions (Thessaloniki A and Thessaloniki B). The coincidence between NUTS 
III regions and electoral constituencies makes these regions the best unit of analysis for the 
link between politics and the territorial distribution of public investment. 
The political periods are determined by the party in office following successive national 
elections between 17 November 1974 and 4 October 2009. During the period considered, two 
parties dominated the political arena in Greece: New Democracy (ND), also known as the 
Liberal Party, and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party (PASOK), also known as the 
Socialist Party. These parties alternated in government during the 10 political periods 
considered in the analysis.
1
 Table 1 displays a) the dates of the national Greek elections, b) 
which party was in office, and c) the changes in governing party. ND was the governing party 
in the periods 1975-1977, 1978-1981, 1990-1993, 2004-2007, and 2008-2009, while PASOK 
was in office during the periods 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1994-1996, 1997-1999, and 2000-
2003. During the period of analysis each party was in office for a total of 5 political periods. 
Changes in power took place in 1975 (from a junta to ND), in 1982 (from ND to PASOK), in 
1990 (PASOK to ND), in 1994 (ND to PASOK), and in 2004 (PASOK to ND). Incumbent 
                                                          
1
 We exclude the three short-lived governments during the period 1989-1990. Between 1989 and 1990 Greece 
lived a rare – at least until the outbreak of the Great Recession – period of political instability. Three different 
governments replaced each other in quick succession: a coalition between the conservatives of New Democracy 
and the Left (03/07/89 - 12/10/1989); a caretaker government (12/10/89 - 23/11/89); and a ‘national unity’ 
government in which New Democracy shared power with both PASOK and the Left (23/11/1989 – 11/04/1990). 
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governments were re-elected five times, 1978 (ND), 1986 (PASOK), 1997 (PASOK), 2000 
(PASOK), and 2008 (ND). 
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
Data on public investment have been provided by the Ministry of Development which is 
responsible for the Public Investment Programme of the country. Public investment 
expenditures include investment expenditures in agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 
manufacturing; energy, mining, and handicraft; transport infrastructures; tourism and modern 
culture; education and research; housing and environment; health and public welfare; water 
supply and sewage facilities; devolved public expenditures to regions and prefectures; special 
infrastructure works; miscellaneous and administrative expenditures; and Olympic Games 
infrastructure projects. EU structural assistance to Greece, the national contribution to EU co-
financed projects, and projects of purely national interest and funding are all included in these 
data (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2015). For each political period, we calculated 
the total volume of public investment expenditures. Although the avowed aim of Greek 
public expenditure has always been – regardless of the political orientation of the party in 
office – that of achieving greater equity and/or efficiency, our hypothesis is that the territorial 
distribution of funds may have been affected by political factors, as public investment in 
Greece has always been open to political discretion. These expenditures may therefore 
capture pork-barrelling. Figure 1 shows the average regional distribution of the total volume 
of public investment expenditures between 1975 and 2009. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
In particular, we formulate and empirically test three hypotheses regarding potential political 
influences in the allocation of public investment across Greek regions. First, we analyse the 
extent to which differences between parties in political power in a given region determine 
public investment expenditures in the region. Second, we assess whether the re-election of a 
party leads to greater pork-barrelling than a first-time election. Third, we examine whether 
public investment expenditures differ depending on the orientation of the party in office (i.e. 
between the Liberal and the Socialist Party). We use the following simple model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡, 𝐶ℎ𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 , 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡)    (1) 
where Invit is the natural logarithm of the total volume of public investment expenditures in 
region i (i = 1, 2, …, 51) at political period t (t = 1, 2, …, 10)2, GovPartyt is a dummy 
variable coding whether the governing party at period t was ND (t = 1, 2, 5, 9, and 10) or 
PASOK (t = 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8) (base category), ChGovPartyt is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the governing party at period t had been re-elected (t = 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10) or changed 
(t = 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9) (base category), PolitPowerit is a vector of regional political power 
variables (i.e. pork-barrel politics variables) in region i and at period t, and Controlit is a 
vector of control variables in region i and at period t. 
                                                          
2
 The dependent variable adopts a logarithmic form, because the distribution of the total volume of public 
investment expenditures is skewed. 
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We expect differences in regional political power – following the ‘loyal’ vs. ‘swing’ voter 
model – to affect the allocation of public investment (Hypothesis 1). We do not anticipate 
differences in pork-barrelling behaviour between the Liberals and the Socialists (Hypothesis 
2), as corruption is widespread in Greek society (European Commission 2014). Finally, we 
consider that re-elected governments, that are already familiar with the levers of power, will 
resort to pork-barrelling in greater measure than first-time elected governments (Hypothesis 
3). 
{
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 = ′𝑁𝐷′
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 = ′𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑂𝐾′
  (2) 
and  
{
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 = ′𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒′
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 
′𝑁𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒′
  (3) 
Equation (1) tests Hypothesis 1, Equation (2) tests Hypothesis 2, and Equation (3) Hypothesis 
3. 
The regional political power variables are depicted by the percentage votes and seats (MPs) 
for each party in each region. More specifically, the regional political power variables include 
the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, and of minority parties, 
measured as: 
 the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of ND (%ND – Votes (Seats)); 
 the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of PASOK (%PASOK – Votes 
(Seats)), and; 
 the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of minority parties (e.g. the Greek 
Communist(s) Parties) (%Rest – Votes (Seats)). 
The regional political power variables also include the (‘absolute’) regional political power of 
the governing party and the regional political power of the governing party relative to the 
main opposition party. This latter variable is known as the ‘relative’ political power of the 
governing party (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2012). The variables, respectively, 
are measured as:   
 the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of the governing party 
(%GovParty – Votes (Seats));3 and 
 the difference in the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of the governing 
party (Dif%GovParty – Votes (Seats)).4 
The value of the relative political power variable for a particular region can be negative in 
those cases where the percentage share of votes or seats in favour of the governing party (ND 
or PASOK) is lower than the percentage share of votes or seats in favour of the main 
opposition party (PASOK or ND, respectively) (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 
2012). 
Finally, the regional political power variables include the political power of single-seat 
constituencies. This variable is measured by a dummy variable (Single-seat constituency) 
coding whether a region returns only one MP to Athens (i.e. single-member) or more (i.e. 
                                                          
3
 Calculated as ‘%GovParty – Votes (Seats)’ = ‘%ND – Votes (Seats)’ x ‘GovParty’ + ‘%PASOK – Votes 
(Seats)’ x (1 – ‘GovParty’). 
4
 Calculated as ‘Dif%GovParty – Votes (Seats)’ = (‘%ND – Votes (Seats)’ – ‘%PASOK – Votes (Seats)’) x 
‘GovParty’ + (‘%PASOK – Votes (Seats)’ - ‘%ND – Votes (Seats)’) x (1 – ‘GovParty’). 
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multi-member) (base category). In single-member settings, the incentives facing individual 
legislators are similar to those facing their political parties. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the natural logarithm of the total volume of 
public investment expenditures (Inv) and the political power variables (PolitPower) by 
governing party (GovParty) and by change in governing party (ChGovParty). This table 
shows that the political power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Votes (Seats)) was higher when 
the governing party changed than when the governing party was re-elected. This difference is 
smaller for the Socialist Party (%PASOK – Votes (Seats)). The political power of the minority 
parties (%Rest – Votes (Seats)) was higher when the governing party was the Liberal Party or 
the governing party had been re-elected. This is possibly because the minority parties 
comprise chiefly the two Communist Parties (the more traditional KKE and the 
Eurocommunist KKE-Interior and their successive transformations), which are closer to the 
Socialists than to the Liberals. Both the absolute and the relative political power of the 
governing party (%GovParty – Votes (Seats) and Dif%GovParty – Votes (Seats)) were higher 
when the governing party was the Liberal Party or the governing party had been re-elected. 
Moreover, the absolute and the relative regional political power of the governing party was 
higher based on the percentage of seats than on the percentage of votes. Finally, the political 
power of single-seat constituencies was higher when the governing party had been re-elected. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
The control variables (Control) include region-specific characteristics that either change over 
time or are time-invariant. The reason for the choice of control variables was related to their 
presence in the literature and previous empirical studies about pork-barrelling and corruption, 
as well as to data availability issues. The time-variant region-specific characteristics are GDP 
per capita (divided by 10,000), as a measure of regional economic development; Density 
which uses regional population density (population/km
2
) in order to capture regional 
agglomeration; and Earthquakes, which is a dummy variable coding earthquakes with victims 
or casualties.
5
 Size (in km
2
 divided by 10,000) is an indicator of the size (area) of the region 
and is a time-invariant, region-specific characteristic.
6
 The empirical specification also 
includes political period dummies to control for all political-period-specific region-invariant 
variables (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2012). All these controls capture some 
regional features and are likely to deal with some sources of heterogeneity reducing the 
omitted variable bias. 
The correlations between the GovParty, ChGovParty, and Control variables are low, but the 
correlations between the regional political power variables (PolitPower) are high.
7
 This 
prevents the examination of the impact of all political power variables on public investment 
expenditures simultaneously. 
                                                          
5
 The reason for controlling for earthquakes is that Greece is a seismic country. Past earthquakes have resulted 
in understandably significant changes in the allocation of public investment expenditures. Examples of such 
changes were the concentration of public funds in affected areas in such as Thessaloniki (1978), Korinthia 
(1981), Messini (1986), Achaia (1995), and Attiki (1999), after earthquakes. 
6
 GDP and population are not included as control variables, since they are highly correlated with each other 
(0.9725) as well as with population density (0.9562 and 0.9818, respectively). 
7
 The correlation coefficients can be provided by the authors upon request. 
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This paper also considers possible differences in the magnitude of the regional political 
influence across different values. In other words, it examines the non-linear effects of politics 
on public investment.  
1. Based on data on the percentage of votes, possible differences between low, medium, and 
high regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, the minority parties, 
and the governing party respectively are examined.
8
 The high political power regions capture 
‘safe’ regions; the medium political power regions capture ‘marginal’ (or ‘swing’) regions; 
while the so-called low political power regions capture ‘hopeless’ regions for the political 
parties. More specifically: 
 if %ND – Votes < 30, %PASOK – Votes < 30, %Rest – Votes < 10 and %GovParty – 
Votes < 30, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, or 
minority parties, and of the governing party, respectively, is low; 
 if 30 ≤ %ND – Votes ≤ 50, 30 ≤ %PASOK – Votes ≤ 50, 10 ≤ %Rest – Votes ≤ 30 and 
30 ≤ %GovParty – Votes ≤ 50, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the 
Socialist Party, minority parties, and the governing party, respectively, is medium 
(base category), and; 
 if %ND – Votes > 50, %PASOK – Votes > 50, %Rest – Votes > 30 and %GovParty – 
Votes > 50, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, 
minority parties, and the governing party, respectively, is high. 
Possible differences between a low, medium, and high relative regional political power of the 
governing party are also taken into account. Thus, 
 if Dif%GovParty – Votes < -5, the relative regional political power of the governing 
party is low and represents the opposition groups (i.e. ‘hopeless’ regions for the 
governing party); 
 if -5 ≤ Dif%GovParty – Votes ≤ 5, the relative regional political power of the 
governing party is medium  (base category) and represents the marginal constituencies 
[i.e. ‘marginal’ (or ‘swing’) regions]; and, 
 if Dif%GovParty – Votes > 5, the relative regional political power of the governing 
party is high and represents the ruling party’s core constituencies (i.e. ‘safe’ regions 
for the governing party). 
2. Based on data on the percentage of seats, possible differences between monopolistic, high, 
medium, low, and no political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party and the 
governing party are considered. Hence, 
 if %ND – Seats = 100, %PASOK – Seats = 100, %GovParty – Seats = 100 and 
Dif%GovParty - Seats = 100, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the 
Socialist Party, and the governing party (absolute or relative) respectively is 
monopolistic; 
 if  50 < %ND – Seats < 100, 50 < %PASOK – Seats < 100, 50 < %GovParty – Seats 
< 100 and 0 < Dif%GovParty – Seats  < 100, the regional political power of the 
                                                          
8
 The scheme used for the allocation of the regions to the different classifications (low, medium and high) is a 
combination of an ‘exogenous’ scheme, defined by criteria external to the distribution of data (e.g. regions with 
high political power are dominated by the two main political parties in Greece); an ‘arbitrary’ scheme, in which 
class boundaries are set by arbitrary criteria such as equal intervals; and an ‘ideographic’ scheme, where class 
boundaries are defined by the shape of the distribution (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2011). Nevertheless, the 
regression results are robust to alternative classifications (e.g. 20 ≤ %ND (%PASOK) – Votes ≤ 40). The 
robustness of the regression results using alternative class boundaries and the distribution of the political 
variables can be provided by the authors upon request. 
10 
 
Liberal Party is higher than that of the Socialist Party, the regional political power of 
the Socialist Party is higher than that of the Liberal Party, and the regional political 
power of the governing party (absolute or relative) is higher than that of the 
opposition party, respectively; 
 if %ND – Seats = 50, %PASOK – Seats = 50, %GovParty – Seats = 50 and 
Dif%GovParty – Seats = 0, the regional political power of the Liberal Party matches 
that of the Socialist Party (i.e. 50 per cent) (base category); 
 if 0 < %ND – Seats < 50, 0 < %PASOK – Seats < 50, 0 < %GovParty – Seats < 50 
and -100 < Dif%GovParty – Seats < 0, the regional political power of the Liberal 
Party is lower than that of the Socialist Party, the regional political power of the 
Socialist Party is lower than that of the Liberal Party, and the regional political power 
of the governing party (absolute or relative) is lower than that of the opposition party, 
respectively; and 
 if %ND – Seats = 0, %PASOK – Seats = 0, %GovParty – Seats = 0 and 
Dif%GovParty - Seats = -100, there is no political power for the Liberal Party, the 
Socialist Party, and the governing party (absolute or relative), respectively. 
As for the minority parties, the paper analyses possible differences in political influence 
between a low percentage seats in the region in favour of the minority parties (%Rest - Seats 
< 5) (base category) and a high percentage of seats (5 ≤ %Rest - Seats ≤ 100). 
 
4. Regression results 
This section presents the regression results of the political determinants of the regional 
distribution of public investment expenditures for 51 NUTS III Greek regions over 10 
political periods. As the regression results do not indicate great differences in the findings 
between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats data, we present only the votes 
data. The seats data are made available in an on-line appendix. In Tables 3-4, Regressions 1-
2 and 11-12 test Hypothesis 1 (equation 1), Regressions 3-6 and 13-16 test Hypothesis 2 
(equation 2), and Regressions 7-10 and 17-20 test Hypothesis 3 (equation 3). These tables 
show the differences in public investment expenditures between the Liberal and the Socialist 
Party (see coefficients on the GovParty variable) as well as between the change and no-
change in the governing party (see coefficients on the ChGovParty variable). As for the 
interpretation of the PolitPower variable which captures pork-barrel politics, we present both 
the linear and non-linear effects. More specifically, Table 3 presents the regional political 
power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Votes) and the Socialist Party (%PASOK – Votes), and 
Table 4 the absolute regional political power of the governing party (%GovParty – Votes) and 
the relative regional political power of the governing party (Dif%GovParty – Votes).  
All estimations have a good fit, as they explain more than two thirds of the variation in 
regional public investment expenditures.
9
 Because of space constraints, we do not report the 
coefficients on the Control variables (i.e. GDP per capita, Size, Density, and Earthquakes).
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The results on the controls show that public investment was higher in large, high-density 
regions and, as expected, in regions which had been affected by earthquakes causing victims 
or casualties. There is, however, no evidence of an association between regional economic 
development and regional public investment expenditures. 
                                                          
9
 In our empirical specifications, any spillover effects may occur only within NUTS III regions, because the 
Moran’s I test (Cliff and Ord 1981) adapted to the estimated residuals rejects the null hypothesis of spatial 
dependence. 
10
 These results can be provided upon request. 
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The results also indicate that the total volume of public investment expenditures was higher 
when the Socialists were in office – during the periods 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1994-1996, 
1997-1999, and 2000-2003 – than when Greece was governed by the Liberals (see the 
coefficients on the GovParty variable). They also demonstrate that, after being re-elected 
(during the periods 1986-1989, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003), the tendency of the Socialist 
Party to make use of public investment for political purposes was significantly greater than 
when elected for the first time (see the coefficients on the ChGovParty variable). 
 
4.1 The regional political power of the Liberal and the Socialist Party 
Table 3 shows a negative association between the regional political power of the Liberal 
Party (%ND – Votes) and public investment in regions where the Liberals were hegemonic 
(%ND > 50) (Regressions 2, 4, 6, and 8). By contrast, there is a positive association between 
both factors in those regions where the Liberals had poor electoral results (%ND < 30) 
(Regressions 2, 6, and 10), and especially in periods when the Socialist Party was in office 
(Regression 4 vs 6). This indicates that the Liberal Party had a preference to use pork-barrel 
politics in order to possibly either attract opposition voters – mainly Socialist – in swing 
districts or with the intention of mobilising their own supporters there. The Socialists, in 
contrast, seem to have adopted a different approach. The results show a positive linear 
association between the regional political power of the Socialist Party (%PASOK – Votes) 
and public investment (Regressions 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19). Investment was particularly 
targeted at regions with a high percentage of Socialist vote (%PASOK > 50) (Regressions 12, 
16, 18, and 20). As can be expected, the association was stronger when the Socialist Party 
was in office (Regression 14 vs 16) and, especially, after being re-elected (Regression 18 vs 
20). Hence, the Socialist Party adopted a different stance with respect to pork-barrelling than 
the Liberals. Rather than courting opposition voters in swing constituencies, they groomed 
their electoral bases in safe districts. 
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
As they were never in office during the period of analysis, it comes as no surprise that there is 
no evidence that the regional political power of minority parties (%Rest – Votes) was 
translated into any changes in public investment (see Appendix 1). The regional political 
power of the Socialist Party was reflected in a more favourable treatment of its safe-seat 
constituencies in terms of public investment. There is less evidence of such behaviour in the 
case of the Liberal Party (see Appendix 2). 
 
4.2 The absolute and relative regional political power of the governing party 
Table 4 shows that there is no evidence of a linear statistically significant association between 
the absolute regional political power of the governing party and regional expenditures 
(Regression 1). This is possibly the result of a negative linear relationship when the Liberal 
Party is considered (Regressions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Table 3) and a positive one in the case of 
the Socialist Party (Regressions 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 of Table 3). However, both parties 
seem to have behaved in a similar way after re-elections (ND in 1978-1981, PASOK in 1986-
1989, PASOK in 1997-1999 and 2000-2003, and ND in 2008-2009). Re-elections of an 
incumbent party are connected to a greater tendency to resort to pork-barrelling, mostly 
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favouring regions that have strongly supported the party in government (%GovParty > 50) 
(Regressions 9 and 10). Therefore, we find that the re-elected governing parties repeatedly 
resorted to skewing the distribution of investments in favour of their core constituencies (i.e. 
‘safe’ regions). Regions that traditionally gave a higher percentage of the vote to the re-
elected governing party generally received larger shares of public investment than their 
neighbours that voted for the opposition party. 
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 
Table 4 also depicts a positive linear relationship between the political power of the 
governing party relative to that of the main opposition party (Dif%GovParty – Votes) and 
overall public investment between 1975 and 2009 (Regression 11). Running the same 
regression by governing party (ND vs PASOK), there is a negative association between the 
relative regional political power of the Liberal Party when in office and public investment 
(Regression 13). Public investment tends to be higher in Liberal Party ‘safe’ regions 
(Dif%GovParty > 5) (Regression 14). However, an increase in the difference in votes 
between the Liberal Party (as governing party) and the Socialist Party is connected to 
declines in public investment, particularly in the safest constituencies. This implies, once 
again, that the Liberal Party had less of a tendency to reward those areas of the country that 
provided them with their strongest electoral support. PASOK behaved in a different way, 
strongly channelling public funds to its core constituencies (Dif%GovParty > 5) (Regression 
15). The safer the region, the greater the investment (Regression 16). Thus, an increase in the 
difference in the political power of the Socialist Party (as governing party) relative to the 
Liberal Party was translated into greater public investment expenditure. The overall outcome 
is positive (Regression 11), reflecting that the coefficient on the relative political power is 
higher for PASOK than for ND (i.e. 0.0157 > 0.0067), meaning that the Socialists made 
greater use of pork-barrelling. Finally, the results show that, as expected, after re-elections 
public investments were skewed towards areas voting for the governing party (Regression 19). 
 
Overall, the regression results depict a widespread political culture of pork-barrelling in 
Greece during the period of analysis. The results fail to reject Hypothesis 1 and 3. PolitPower 
variables show that pork-barrelling matters for the distribution of public investment 
expenditures (Hypothesis 1), while the coefficients on the ChGovParty variables indicate that 
there are differences in public investment expenditures between first-time and re-elected 
governments (Hypothesis 3). The only hypothesis that is rejected is Hypothesis 2, as the 
Socialist Party made a more extensive use of pork-barrelling than the Liberals when in office. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has delved into the largely overlooked question of the presence and relevance of 
pork-barrel politics in the four decades after the restoration of democracy in Greece. The 
results of the analysis have confirmed the presence of widespread pork-barrel practices in the 
geographical distribution of public investment. Pork-barrel politics during the 35-year time-
period between 1974 and 2009 have distorted regional development policy priorities, as the 
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distribution of public investment responded, to a large extent, to the governments’ self-
interests. 
However, while pork-barrelling was practiced by the two parties that alternated in power in 
the period between the restoration of democracy and the outbreak of the Great Recession, the 
analysis has revealed that each party followed a different strategy. The Liberal Party mainly 
allocated public investment with the aim of gaining additional support and new seats in 
Parliament by courting the electorate in ‘swing’ constituencies. The Socialist, by contrast, 
preferred rewarding electoral trust, overspending in ‘safe’ electoral districts. Re-election 
exacerbated these practices. Re-elected governments splashed more on pork-barrelling once 
the confidence of the electorate was renewed and decision-makers felt more at ease with 
governing Greece. The Socialist party, according to the results of the analysis, made greater 
public investment spending than the Liberals, as the public investment link to votes and MPs 
was highest during the periods between 1986-1989, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003, coinciding 
with the re-election of PASOK. These results are robust to measuring political power by 
votes as well as by MPs. 
Political influences in the allocation of public investment can be considered as an important 
source of distortion for regional development policy priorities and a serious institutional flaw 
in the functioning of the Greek democracy. They may have also been a reason behind the 
excessive spending which led to the generation of substantial annual deficits and debts. In 
this respect, this article sets a marker about the role played by political parties in undermining 
the efficiency of the regional development effort for real or perceived party-political gains. 
However, this article has mostly only scratched the surface, establishing connections, but not 
exploring the mechanisms through which this pork-barrel was generated, allowed, managed, 
and tolerated. More research is needed, first, in order to assess whether Greece represents a 
particular case in terms of pork-barrel politics or whether this type of behaviour is – as 
implied by some of the literature highlighted in the literature review – more widespread, 
especially across other southern European countries. In addition, more qualitative and in-
depth research will have to be conducted in order to assess the exact ways in which decision-
makers influenced and shaped the allocation of public investment for the benefit of their 
parties, often at the expense of sound and efficient policies and of the Greek people as a 
whole.   
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Table 1: Political periods 
a/a Date of national 
elections 
Political period Governing party Change or no change 
in governing party 
1 17-Nov-1974 1975-1977 ND Change 
2 20-Nov-1977 1978-1981 ND No Change 
3 18-Oct-1981 1982-1985 PASOK Change 
4 02-Jun-1985 1986-1989 PASOK No Change 
5 08-Apr-1990 1990-1993 ND Change 
6 10-Oct-1993 1994-1996 PASOK Change 
7 22-Sept-1996 1997-1999 PASOK No Change 
8 09-Apr-2000 2000-2003 PASOK No Change 
9 07-Mar-2004 2004-2007 ND Change 
10 16-Sept-2007 2008-2009 ND No Change 
 04-Oct-2009    
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
GovParty or 
ChGovParty Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inv 
ND 255 18.2680 0.8864 16.3872 21.9577 
PASOK 255 18.4727 0.7714 16.9068 22.2913 
CHANGE 255 18.3937 0.8419 16.3872 21.9577 
NO CHANGE 255 18.3470 0.8319 16.7967 22.2913 
%ND – Votes 
ND 255 47.4158 8.5953 15.2608 76.0418 
PASOK 255 41.0887 5.9307 25.1183 56.9166 
CHANGE 255 46.0856 9.1732 15.2608 76.0418 
NO CHANGE 255 42.4188 6.1848 16.0087 56.9166 
%PASOK – Votes 
ND 255 33.6072 10.6966 10.8753 56.5183 
PASOK 255 45.4700 5.9932 30.4159 64.3227 
CHANGE 255 39.6439 11.5178 11.8679 64.3227 
NO CHANGE 255 39.4333 9.3965 10.8753 64.3227 
%Rest – Votes 
ND 255 18.9770 10.7596 0.6593 60.5497 
PASOK 255 13.4413 5.2459 4.8921 40.4836 
CHANGE 255 14.2706 7.5967 0.6593 46.8271 
NO CHANGE 255 18.1478 9.6652 5.5727 60.5497 
%GovParty – Votes 
ND 255 47.4158 8.5953 15.2608 76.0418 
PASOK 255 45.4700 5.9932 30.4159 64.3227 
CHANGE 255 49.0039 7.8962 15.2608 76.0418 
NO CHANGE 255 43.8818 6.0148 16.0087 64.3227 
Dif%GovParty – 
Votes 
ND 255 13.8085 16.1500 -22.6513 63.1174 
PASOK 255 4.3814 10.7081 -22.0465 38.3043 
CHANGE 255 12.2784 16.3159 -22.6513 63.1174 
NO CHANGE 255 5.9115 11.5559 -22.0465 38.7679 
%ND – Seats 
ND 255 64.1391 23.4825 0 100 
PASOK 255 38.4885 20.1750 0 100 
CHANGE 255 53.9657 25.2271 0 100 
NO CHANGE 255 48.6619 25.2627 0 100 
%PASOK – Seats 
ND 255 30.1332 20.3458 0 100 
PASOK 255 59.0030 19.2656 0 100 
CHANGE 255 42.1030 24.6845 0 100 
NO CHANGE 255 47.0333 24.1239 0 100 
%Rest – Seats 
ND 255 5.7278 14.9495 0 100 
PASOK 255 2.5085 6.4278 0 33.33334 
CHANGE 255 3.9314 13.6507 0 100 
NO CHANGE 255 4.3048 9.1430 0 50 
%GovParty – Seats 
ND 255 64.1391 23.4825 0 100 
PASOK 255 59.0030 19.2656 0 100 
CHANGE 255 62.8678 21.5378 0 100 
NO CHANGE 255 60.2743 21.6467 0 100 
Dif%GovParty – 
Seats 
ND 255 34.0059 41.3191 -100 100 
PASOK 255 20.5145 38.9239 -100 100 
CHANGE 255 29.6670 39.5323 -100 100 
NO CHANGE 255 24.8534 41.7046 -100 100 
Single-seat 
constituency 
ND 255 0.1137 0.3181 0 1 
PASOK 255 0.1059 0.3083 0 1 
CHANGE 255 0.0980 0.2980 0 1 
NO CHANGE 255 0.1216 0.3274 0 1 
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Table 3: The regional political power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Votes) and the Socialist Party (%PASOK – Votes) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
PASOK base base     base base base base 
ND -0.6052*** -0.6231***     -0.1681 -0.2291** -0.6573*** -0.6391*** 
b. ChGovParty           
Change base base base base base base     
No change 0.0484 0.0891 0.1193 0.1307 0.2488*** 0.1710**     
c. PolitPower  
Political power of the 
Liberal Party 
          
%ND – Votes -0.0161***  -0.0097**  -0.0275***  -0.0154***  -0.0170***  
 %ND < 30  0.3010**  0.2261  0.3767**  0.2456  0.3745* 
 30 ≤ %ND ≤ 50  base  base  base  base  base 
 %ND > 50  -0.1942***  -0.1412*  -0.4034***  -0.2180***  -0.1565 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7302 0.7255 0.7122 0.7124 0.7577 0.7417 0.7470 0.7440 0.7141 0.7084 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
a. GovParty           
PASOK base base     base base base base 
ND -0.5234*** -0.5812***     -0.1059 -0.5059*** -0.1401 -0.2571 
b. ChGovParty           
Change base base base base base base     
No change -0.0724 0.1119 0.0378 0.0994 0.2027** 0.1694**     
c. PolitPower 
Political power of the 
Socialist Party 
          
%PASOK – Votes 0.0172***  0.0105*  0.0250***  0.0114**  0.0249***  
 %PASOK < 30  -0.1278  -0.1401    0.1611  -0.3885** 
 30 ≤ %PASOK ≤ 50  base  base  base  base  base 
 %PASOK > 50  0.2906***  0.1219  0.3349***  0.2153**  0.3855*** 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7295 0.7274 0.7111 0.7086 0.7537 0.7475 0.7387 0.7393 0.7252 0.7234 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
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Table 4: The absolute and relative regional political power of the governing party (%GovParty – Votes and Dif%GovParty – Votes, respectively) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK Base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6159*** -0.6115***     -0.3859*** -0.3949*** -0.5836*** -0.6390*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change Base base         
ChGovParty: No change 0.2665** 0.2989***         
c. PolitPower  
Absolute political power of 
the governing party 
          
%GovParty – Votes 0.0046      -0.0012  0.0127**  
 %GovParty < 30  0.3092      0.2259  0.3267 
 30 ≤ %GovParty ≤ 50  base      base  base 
 %GovParty > 50  0.0995*      -0.0162  0.2873*** 
Observations 510 510     255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7172 0.7193     0.7320 0.7326 0.7088 0.7155 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK Base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6334*** -0.6363***     -0.4309*** -0.4057*** -0.7401*** -0.6855*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change Base base base base base base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.3290*** 0.2336** 0.0328 0.1953 0.2516*** 0.2074**     
c. PolitPower 
Relative political power of 
the governing party 
          
Dif%GovParty – Votes 0.0038**  -0.0067**  0.0157***  0.0012  0.0074**  
 Dif%GovParty < -5  -0.0285  -0.2967**  0.1729**  -0.0799  0.0083 
 -5 ≤ Dif%GovParty ≤ 5  base  base  base  base  base 
 Dif%GovParty > 5  0.0440  -0.3453***  0.3413***  -0.0561  0.1307 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7184 0.7173 0.7134 0.7183 0.7624 0.7423 0.7322 0.7325 0.7085 0.7056 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies; we do not present Reg. 3 and 4 because they are presented in Reg. 3 and 4 of Table 3 and, similarly, we do not present 
Reg. 5 and 6 because they are presented in Reg. 15 and 16 of Table 3. 
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Figure 1: The regional distribution of public investment expenditures 
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Appendix 1: The regional political power of the minority parties (%Rest – Votes) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6270*** -0.6444***     -0.4797*** -0.4422*** -0.4856*** -0.5527*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change base base base base base base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.2242** 0.2148** 0.2402* 0.2355* 0.0895 0.0885     
c. PolitPower  
Political power of the 
minority parties 
          
%Rest – Votes 0.0022  0.0029  0.0008  0.0079*  -0.0055  
 %Rest < 10  -0.0893*  -0.1822*  -0.0331  -0.0613  -0.1172 
 10 ≤ %Rest ≤ 30  base  base  base  base  base 
 %Rest > 30  -0.0084  -0.0087  0.2972  0.1693  -0.1629 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7162 0.7177 0.7070 0.7111 0.7210 0.7220 0.7350 0.7346 0.7022 0.7050 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
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Appendix 2: Comparing the regional political power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Votes), the Socialist 
Party (%PASOK – Votes) and the minority parties (%Rest – Votes) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ND PASOK CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. GovParty      
GovParty: PASOK base   base base 
GovParty: ND -0.5517***   -0.1255 -0.2249 
b. ChGovParty      
ChGovParty: Change base base base   
ChGovParty: No change -0.0704 0.0372 0.2555***   
c. PolitPower  
Comparing the political 
power 
     
%ND – Votes base base base base base 
%PASOK – Votes 0.0212*** 0.0134** 0.0315*** 0.0165*** 0.0273*** 
%Rest – Votes 0.0106*** 0.0071 0.0184*** 0.0141*** 0.0060 
Observations 510 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7337 0.7134 0.7627 0.7472 0.7264 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies.
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On-line Appendix 1: The regional political power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Seats) and the Socialist Party (%PASOK – Seats) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.5514*** -0.5694***     -0.2247** -0.2221* -0.5216*** -0.4685*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change base base base base base base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.1289 0.0632 0.1436 0.0910 0.0974 0.1493*     
c. PolitPower  
Political power of the 
Liberal Party 
          
%ND – Seats -0.0035***  -0.0031**  -0.0036***  -0.0038**  -0.0032**  
 %ND = 0  -0.1036  -0.1909  -0.1200  -0.0988  -0.1089 
 0 < %ND < 50  0.2071***  0.2407**  0.2002***  0.1761**  0.2253*** 
 %ND = 50  base  base  base  base  base 
 50 < %ND < 100  -0.0317  0.0395  -0.1487*  0.0191  -0.0646 
 %ND = 100  -0.2999***  -0.2022*  -0.5036**  -0.2640**  -0.3250*** 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7231 0.7361 0.7116 0.7221 0.7294 0.7539 0.7387 0.7468 0.7083 0.7272 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.5503*** -0.5223***     -0.2549** -0.2382** -0.5264*** -0.4289*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change base base base base base base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.1601 0.1295 0.1784 0.1446 0.1005 0.1560*     
c. PolitPower  
Political power of the 
Socialist Party 
          
%PASOK – Seats 0.0029***  0.0022  0.0031**  0.0032**  0.0026*  
 %PASOK = 0  -0.2981***  -0.2064*  -0.5073**  -0.2194**  -0.3966*** 
 0 < %PASOK < 50  -0.0506  0.0243  -0.1846**  0.0356  -0.1335 
 %PASOK = 50  base  base  base  base  base 
 50 < %PASOK < 100  0.2030***  0.1786  0.1931***  0.1953**  0.1994** 
 %PASOK = 100  -0.1840**  -0.4642  -0.2079**  -0.0951  -0.2474** 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7201 0.7371 0.7087 0.7190 0.7264 0.7628 0.7366 0.7465 0.7047 0.7312 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
  
25 
  
 
On-line Appendix 2: The absolute and relative regional political power of the governing party (%GovParty – Seats and Dif%GovParty – Seats, 
respectively) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK Base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6162*** -0.6290***     -0.3624*** -0.3231*** -0.6132*** -0.6158*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change Base base         
ChGovParty: No change 0.2051* 0.1482         
c. PolitPower  
Absolute political power of the 
governing party 
          
%GovParty – Seats -0.0002      -0.0015  0.0008  
 %GovParty = 0  -0.3319**      -0.2561  -0.3722* 
 0 < %GovParty < 50  0.0035      0.1290  -0.0738 
 %GovParty = 50  base      base  base 
 50 < %GovParty < 100  0.1218**      0.0950  0.1493** 
 %GovParty = 100  -0.1974***      -0.1864*  -0.2147** 
Observations 510 510     255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7160 0.7321     0.7330 0.7445 0.7014 0.7250 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK Base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6182*** -0.6304***     -0.3670*** -0.3260*** -0.6251*** -0.6318*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change Base base base base base base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.2186** 0.1357 0.1521 0.1260 0.0995 0.1464*     
c. PolitPower 
Relative political power of the 
governing party 
          
Dif%GovParty – Seats 0.0002  -0.0016*  0.0017**  -0.0007  0.0008  
 Dif%GovParty = -100  -0.4990***  -0.4683  -0.5057**  -0.3286  -0.5580*** 
 -100 < Dif%GovParty < 0  -0.0123  0.2842**  -0.1476*  0.1370  -0.0970 
 Dif%GovParty = 0  base  base  base  base  base 
 0 < Dif%GovParty < 100  0.1047**  -0.0316  0.2104***  0.0812  0.1306* 
 Dif%GovParty = 100  -0.2091***  -0.2396**  -0.2047**  -0.1888*  -0.2337** 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7161 0.7321 0.7106 0.7243 0.7280 0.7610 0.7326 0.7429 0.7025 0.7268 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies; we do not present Reg. 3 and 4 because they are presented in Reg. 3 and 4 of on-line Appendix 1 and, similarly, we do 
not present Reg. 5 and 6 because they are presented in Reg. 15 and 16 of on-line Appendix 1.
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On-line Appendix 3: The political power of the single-seat constituency  
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ND PASOK CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. GovParty      
GovParty: PASOK base   base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6074***   -0.4050*** -0.6083*** 
b. ChGovParty      
ChGovParty: Change base base base   
ChGovParty: No change 0.2335** 0.2310* 0.1072   
c. PolitPower      
Single-seat constituency -0.2586*** -0.1889* -0.3337*** -0.1979* -0.3082*** 
Observations 510 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7236 0.7102 0.7354 0.7359 0.7129 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
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On-line Appendix 4: The regional political power of the minority parties (%Rest – Seats) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 ALL ALL ND ND PASOK PASOK CHANGE CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a. GovParty           
GovParty: PASOK base base     base base base base 
GovParty: ND -0.6320*** -0.6583***     -0.3949*** -0.3869*** -0.6439*** -0.6404*** 
b. ChGovParty           
ChGovParty: Change base base base base base Base     
ChGovParty: No change 0.1895* 0.1567 0.2040* 0.1685 0.0736 0.0686     
c. PolitPower  
Political power of the 
minority parties 
          
%Rest – Seats 0.0035*  0.0027  0.0106**  0.0015  0.0086**  
 %Rest < 5  base  base  base  base  base 
 5 ≤ %Rest ≤ 100  0.2619***  0.2598***  0.2718***  0.2730***  0.2505*** 
Observations 510 510 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7181 0.7271 0.7083 0.7182 0.7273 0.7322 0.7325 0.7426 0.7082 0.7120 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
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On-line Appendix 5: Comparing the regional political power of the Liberal Party (%ND – Seats), the 
Socialist Party (%PASOK – Seats) and the minority parties (%Rest – Seats) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 
 ALL ND PASOK CHANGE NO 
CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. GovParty      
GovParty: PASOK base   base Base 
GovParty: ND -0.5606***   -0.2177* -0.5741*** 
b. ChGovParty      
ChGovParty: Change base base base   
ChGovParty: No change 0.1279 0.1451 0.0857   
c. PolitPower  
Comparing the political power 
     
%ND – Seats base base base base Base 
%PASOK – Seats 0.0032*** 0.0029* 0.0029** 0.0039** 0.0022 
%Rest – Seats 0.0043** 0.0035 0.0099** 0.0033 0.0080** 
Observations 510 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.7233 0.7117 0.7318 0.7388 0.7108 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all regressions include controls, constant and time-dummies. 
 
